Abstract-Secret Key Establishment (SKE) over a pair of independent Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channels (DMBCs) was studied in [3] where lower and upper bounds on the secretkey capacity were provided. In this paper, we study the above setup for two cases: (1) the DMBCs have "secrecy potential", and (2) the DMBCs are stochastically degraded with independent channels. For (1), we propose a simple SKE protocol using the novel Interactive Channel Coding (ICC) method and prove that it achieves the lower bound. For (2), we give a simplified expression for the lower bound and prove that, when one of the legitimate parties sends only i.i.d. variables, the lower bound is tight and the capacity is achieved by a two-round protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following problem of Secret Key Establishment (SKE): Alice and Bob want to share a secret key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Information-theoretic solutions to this problem assume a collection of sources and/or channels available to the parties. We refer this as a setup.
Wyner's pioneering work [15] and its generalization by Csiszár and Körner [6] considered transmission of secure messages over a Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC) from Alice to Bob and Eve. They showed that secure communication is possible if Bob's channel is less noisy [10] than Eve's. These results can be used for SKE since any secure message transmission protocol can be applied to send a secret-key over the channel from Alice to Bob (or vice versa). Extensions to [6] , [15] have investigated SKE in new setups, with new types of resources such as Public discussion channel [1] , [7] , [12] , secure feedback channel [2] , modulo-additive channel [11] , and correlated sources [9] , [13] .
In many cases, special types of channels, e.g., public discussion channels, must be realized from basic resources like noisy channels. In [3] , we introduced a new setup for SKE, called 2DMBC, where the only resources available to Alice and Bob are two independent DMBCs in the two directions. This setup naturally models wireless networks where two nodes can communicate interactively and their communication is eavesdropped by their wireless neighbors. The secret-key capacity in this setup is defined as the maximum rate of secure and reliable key establishment, in bits per channel use. Lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup have been derived and shown to coincide when the DMBCs are "physically" degraded [3] .
A. Our work
Motivated by the application of the theoretical results in practice, we extend the results of [3] to the following cases.
1) We consider the 2DMBC setup when it satisfies the following property: realizing a noiseless channel from any of the DMBCs does not lead to achieve the secret-key capacity of the 2DMBC. In this case, we say colloquially that both DMBCs have "secrecy potential". This term becomes more obvious in Section III-A. In most of the channels of interest such as binary symmetric broadcast channels and Gaussian broadcast channels, this occurs when the DMBCs have nonzero secrecy capacities. For this case, We propose a tworound SKE protocol based on a new method, which we call Interactive Channel Coding (ICC), to achieve the lower bound in [3] . This lower bound was proved before by a SKE protocol that uses an elaborate two-level coding construction whose efficient design is a challenge in practice. ICC, however, can be seen as an interactive version of systematic channel coding in which the messages are essentially codewords from a systematic error correcting code, split into two parts: one received in the first round and one sent in the second round. Although the proof in Section IV-A is based on jointly typical decoding, the efficient design of almost capacity-achieving systematic codes, such as LDPCs (see e.g. [14] ), can be directly used for the efficient construction of the ICC protocol.
2) We study the 2DMBC setup when the DMBCs are stochastically degraded with independent channels. We refer to this setup as sd-2DMBC. This study is motivated by observing that the results in [3] for the secret-key capacity of (physically) degraded 2DMBCs do not necessarily hold for stochastically degraded 2DMBCs. In setups like [6] , [7] , [9] , [13] that do not offer interactive communication, physically and stochastically degraded broadcast channels are the same in terms of the secret-key capacity. This is not true, however, for the 2DMBC setup in which interactive communication is permitted. Two important classes of stochastically degraded channels with independent components are binary symmetric broadcast channels and Gaussian broadcast channels. We note that our results can be easily extended to continuous memoryless channels.
2-a) We give a simplified expression for the lower bound on the secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC setup that results in a simpler maximization problem.
2-b) We consider sd-2DMBC when one of the parties only sends i.i.d. variables. We prove the lower bound is tight, and the secret-key capacity is achieved by a two-round protocol. An example application for (20-b) is when a base station, with sufficient offline but limited realtime computation power, wants to establish keys with multiple terminals in different locations. In realtime, the station only sends i.i.d. variables in different rounds and stores them along with responses from the terminals. When the communication is over, it uses the stored information to calculate secret-keys with each terminal in the offline mode.
II. MODELS, DEFINITIONS, AND EXISTING RESULTS
The 2DMBC setup ( Fig. 1) consists of a forward DMBC, → ( , ) specified by , from Bob to Alice (and Eve). We assume that each party has free access to an independent source of randomness.
An SKE protocol in this setup may contain several rounds. In each round, either Alice or Bob sends a sequence of random variables (RVs) which is computed using some independent randomness and the communicated (sent and/or received) sequences in previous rounds. Finally, each party will have a set of communicated sequences that forms their view. Using their views, one of the legitimate parties computes the key , and the other one computes an estimate of the keyˆ.
Definition 1: [3] An SKE protocol Π in the 2DMBC setup is ( , )-secure if it results in the key , its estimateˆ, and Eve's view such that
where (resp. ) is the number of times that the forward (resp. backward) channel is used. 
The secret-key capacity is lower bounded [3] as
where
and
III. STATEMENT OF MAIN RESULTS

A. The interactive channel coding protocol
We introduce the interactive channel coding (ICC) method and use it to design the so-called ICC protocol for SKE. ICC is based on capacity-achieving systematic channel codes, whose efficient design has been well studied.
Definition 3: A (bipartite) systematic channel code, with encoding alphabets ( , ) and decoding alphabets ( , ), is a pair of encoding/decoding functions ( / ), where
, ) and = , + , ; we call , the parity check sequence.
• :
assigns a guess sequence (ˆ||ˆ, ) to each input ( || ). The general construction of the ICC protocol is given in [4] . We describe ICC for a special case where = , 2, = 1, 1, = , and Alice is the initiator (see Fig. 2 ). Accordingly, we rephrase the expression to be maximized and the constraint condition in (5), respectively as
where > 0 is a small constant to be determined from . Let = , + , , where , is chosen to satisfy
Let = + and be a small constant such that 5 < . Let , (resp. , , ) be the set of all -typical sequences w.r.t.
(resp. ) in (resp. , ); Define In the above, the key derivation phase is the same as that in [3] . However, the encoding/decoding phase uses the novel ICC method, which can be seen as Bob having a message ( || , ) and sending its corresponding codeword, ( || ) to Alice where she receives the bipartite sequence ( || ) through the channels → ( , ) and → ( , ), respectively. This intuitively suggests that the achievable secret-key rate by the ICC protocol is the average over the secret-key rates of these two channels.
Theorem 1: Taking the variables from (2) and (3), the ICC protocol can achieve the secret-key rate 
Comparing (5) with (10), we conclude that and are equal if 2 is non-negative for the values that maximize the expression in (5): in brief, we say when the backward DMBC has secrecy potential. Similarly, = if the forward DMBC has secrecy potential.
Corollary 1: When the DMBCs have "secrecy potential", the ICC protocol can achieve the lower bound in (4).
B. The secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC setup
We use sd-2DMBC to refer to a 2DMBC when each DMBC is stochastically degraded with independent channels. 
, ,
The expressions (13) and (14) do not contain the RVs 1, , 2, , 1, , and 2, . So, the maximization problem in obtaining the lower bound (12) is easier compared to (4).
2) single-letter characterization:
We consider a scenario where one of the legitimate parties can only send i.i.d. variables, and derive an expression for the secret-key capacity under this condition.
Theorem 2: When one of the legitimate parties can only send i.i.d. variables, the secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC setup equals max{ ′ , ′ }, where ′ and ′ are given in (13) and (14), respectively.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1 (a special case)
We give the proof for the special case mentioned in Section III-A. For the complete proof, we refer the reader to [4] .
1) Randomness Analysis, proving (1a):
The key is calculated from sequences in , and , , . From AEP (e.g., [5, Chapter 8] 
Hence, for every ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 },
2) Reliability Analysis, proving (1b): For > 0, for sufficiently large , from AEP we have ∈ , with high probability, and so the encoding phase is successful. Using joint-AEP for bipartite sequences [3, Appendix D] , if is sufficiently smaller than ( ; ) + ( ; ), the decoding error probability becomes arbitrarily close to zero.
Inequality (a) follows from (15) and (17), and inequality (b) follows from (9) . This gives
3) Secrecy Analysis, proving (1c):
The first two terms above are written respectively as
Inequality (a) follows from (16) 
, and , one can search all the codewords in and return a uniqueˇ,ˇ∈ that is ( , )-bipartite jointly typical [3] , ) ; otherwise, return a NULL. The number of the codewords is | | = | | = 2 . If is sufficiently smaller than ( ; ) + ( ; ), from joint-AEP for bipartite sequences [3, Appendix D], the above jointly-typical decoding will result in arbitrarily small error probability.
This gives Pr
where ℎ( ) is the binary entropy function. Applying (21)- (23) to (20) gives
where the last inequality is obtained by appropriate selection of and for an arbitrarily small .
B. Proof of Proposition 1
From (2a) and the independence of the two DMCs in the sd-2DMBC setup (see Definitions 4 and 5), ↔ ↔ ↔ forms a Markov chain, and so we write (3a) and (3c) as 
hold, and ( ; ) = ( ;˜), ( ; ) = ( ;˜) ( 1, ; | 2, ) = ( 1, ;˜| 2, ),
Hence, we write (3b) as Inequality (a) follows from (26). More precisely, if (26a) holds the inequality is easily satisfied, and if (26b) holds both sides equal zero. It is easy to see that equality in (27) holds by choosing 2, = 1 and 1, to be or 1, in the case of (26a) or (26b), respectively. In analogy to the above, we have
and equality holds for some 2, and 1, (similar to those given for (27)). By replacing 1 , 2 , 1 , and 2 in (5) and (6) with the above quantities, (4) is simplified to (12) .
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We let Alice be the party who sends i.i.d. variables. The other case follows by symmetry. We use Lemma 1 to reduce a multi-round SKE protocol to a two-round one, and then give the highest rate that a two-round protocol can achieve.
Lemma 1: When Alice can only send i.i.d. variables, the secret-key capacity is achieved by a two-round SKE protocol whose initiator is Alice.
Proof: Let Π be a -round SKE protocol that achieves the secret-key capacity under the above condition. [9] proves an upper bound on the secret-key capacity that coincides with the lower bound in (12) . However, the proof in [9] can not be directly applied to our problem due to the "stochastic" degradedness of the (backward) DMBC. We give the following argument to upper bound the highest achievable rate for an arbitrarily small > 0 as in (1) .
The views of the parties at the end of the second round are = ( , ), = ( , ), and = ( , ). Using Fano's inequality for (1b), we have
Furthermore, (1c) gives
For brevity, we omit the length of the sequences from the superscripts, and use bold to denote them. 
where inequality (a) follows from (29) and (30). We discuss the first terms in ( 
